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THE LEGAL FICTION OF DE FACTO
PARENTHOOD
William C. Duncan*
"They who can read the political sky will see a hurricane in a cloud no bigger
than an hand at the very edge of the horizon, and will run into the first
harbor." Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Present Discontents (1770)1
To understand the relentless novelty of recent proposals for reconfiguring
legal parenthood, it is helpful to review the default rules for determining legal
parent status. Until quite recently, legal parenthood was largely coterminous
with biological parenthood. Exceptions remained at least conceptually linked to
biological reality. Thus, the longstanding presumption that the wife's husband
is the father of a child born to her originates in the common-sense assumption
that the husband is likely to be (or perhaps, ought to be) the biological father of
the child while it maintains the integrity of a family. Even adoption, which
extinguishes the parental rights of biological parents, has traditionally been
organized by law in such a way as to create adoptive families that imitate
biological parent families.2
Relying on biology, marriage and adoption as the pillars of legal
parenthood also promoted certainty and stability for parents and children.
Certainty by referencing objective verifiable criteria (the existence of a marriage,
or a biological relationship or an adoption decree) and also by limiting the
categories of adults who could claim the status of parenthood; and stability by
promoting child-rearing settings that invoked independent variables that
increase the likelihood of commitment between parents and children (such as
biological ties and the obligations inherent in marriage).
LEGISLATIVE REDEFINITION OF PARENTHOOD
In July 2009, the Delaware Legislature passed a statute creating a legal
status of "de facto parent."3 The statute gives family courts the ability to
designate as a child's de facto parent, an unrelated adult. The court decides that
this status can be given based on three factors. First, the adult must have "had
the support and consent of the child's parent or parents who fostered the
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship between the child and
the de facto parent." Second, the person "exercised parental responsibility for
Director, Marriage Law Foundation.
1. 1 SELECr WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 105 (Liberty Fund 1999).
2. See Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear
Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 MO. L. REV. 527, 605-06 (2001).
3. 77 Del. Laws c. 97 §§1-3 (2009).
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the child." Finally, he or she must have "acted in a parental role for a length of
time sufficient to have established a bonded and dependent relationship with
the child that is parental in nature."4 The relationship between the adults to be
recognized as parents is irrelevant to the court.5 As is the number of parents
who may seek that recognition since nothing in the law limits the number of a
child's parents to two.6 The Delaware Senate passed the bill unanimously on
May 14 and the House approved it in a 34-2 vote on June 24. The governor
signed the bill July 6, 2009.7
The closest statutory antecedent to Delaware's law is a 2007 statute in the
District of Columbia.8 This law allows a "de facto" parent to seek custody of a
child on breakup of a relationship. A de facto parent is someone who meets one
of two sets of criteria. In the first, the person must show he or she had "lived
with the child in the same household at the time of the child's birth or
adoption"; who has "taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child's
parent"; and who has "held himself or herself out as the child's parent with the
agreement of the child's parent or, if there are 2 parents, both parents."9 An
alternative set of criteria would require the prospective de facto parent to show
he or she "lived with the child in the same household for at least 10 of the 12
months" before seeking custody; "formed a strong emotional bond with the
child with the encouragement and intent of the child's parent that a parent-
child relationship form between the child and the third party"; took "full and
permanent responsibilities as the child's parent"; and "held himself or herself
out as the child's parent with the agreement of the child's parent, or if there are
2 parents, both parents." 10 Note that the last criterion in both sets would allow
for at least three "parents" for each child.
The Delaware and D.C. legislation had been anticipated by the American
Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution published in 2002. The
ALI Principles included a recommendation that state legislatures recognize a
status of de facto parenthood, like the D.C. law, in the context of the breakup of
a relationship. For the purposes of the Principles, a de facto parents is an
unrelated adult who has lived with a child for two years and provides a
majority of childcare (or at least as much as the primary residential legal parent)
with the acquiescence of the legal parent or where the legal parent fails to so
provide. 11 Only one of a child's legal parents needs to allow the de facto parent
4. 13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §8-201 (2006).
5. See Nancy Polikoff, Delaware Legislature Gets It Right on Children with Two Moms, BEYOND
(STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, Aug. 13, 2009,
http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.com/2009/08/delaware-legislature-gets-it-right-
on.html.
6. See Nancy Polikoff, More Thoughts on Delaware De Facto Parent Law -a Child Can Have Three
Parents, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, Aug. 15, 2009,
http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.com/2009/08/more-thoughts-on-delaware-de-
facto.html.
7. S.B. 84, 145th Gen. Assem. (Del. 2009),
http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/LIS145.NSF/vwLegislation/SB+84?Opendocument.
8. D.C. CODE §16-831.01 (2001).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
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to be involved in the child's life. Thus, one parent could allow another person to
establish a de facto parent relationship without the knowledge and consent of
the other legal parent. 12 In this situation, a father might be surprised to find
himself splitting time with his child not only with an ex-wife but with one or
more of her subsequent boyfriends. Unlike the Delaware and D.C. laws, the
Principles do allow "responsibility for making significant life decisions" for the
child to be limited to two persons at the same time (unless the legal parents
want to waive that limitation).13
This novel legal status has also been recognized in a handful of state court
decisions. 14 One of the early decisions in Massachusetts provided the ex-partner
of a child's biological parent with standing to seek visitation.1 5 The court based
its conclusion on its finding that the partner was a de facto parent, a legal status
the majority felt was "in accord with notions of the modern family." 16 The court
defined a de facto parent in the following passage:
A child may be a member of a nontraditional family in which he is parented
by a legal parent and a de facto parent. A de facto parent is one who has no
biological relation to the child, but has participated in the child's life as a
member of the child's family. The de facto parent resides with the child and,
with the consent and encouragement of the legal parent, performs a share of
caretaking functions at least as great as the legal parent. The de facto parent
shapes the child's daily routine, addresses his developmental needs,
disciplines the child, provides for his education and medical care and serves
as a moral guide.17
More recently, the Washington Supreme Court recognized the status of de
facto parent in a dispute between a child's mother and her former partner over
the child's legal parentage.18 The court said a de facto parent is a person who
can meet criteria first outlined in a Wisconsin decision: (1) the unrelated adult
has a "parent-like relationship" with a child which the "natural or legal parent
consented to and fostered," (2) the adult lived in the same house as the child, (3)
the adult performed child care tasks without pay, and (4) the adult "has been in
a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a
bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature."19 The court said that from
the point of its decision on, Washington law would provide that "a de facto
RECOMMENDATIONS §2.03 (2002).
12. David Wagner, Balancing "Parents Are" and "Parents Do" in the Supreme Court's
Constitutionalized Family Law: Some Implications for the ALI Proposals on De Facto Parenthoold, 2001
BYU L. REv. 1175,1183 (2001).
13. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 2.09, 2.18 (2002).
14. See, e.g., In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000);
Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).
15. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999).
16. Id. at 891.
17. Id.
18. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
19. Id. at 176.
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parent stands in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent, whether biological,
adoptive, or otherwise." 20
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DE FACTO PARENT STATUS
In his important study of the no-fault divorce revolution, Professor Herbert
Jacob noted that a change in family law as momentous as no-fault would have
presumably been "the product of controversy and conflict, of a mass movement
or of vigorous interest group activity as recorded by the media." 21 He found
that, instead, the change to no-fault divorce was largely treated by legislators as
"routine" policy making, more fit for "experts" "because only professionals
ha[d] sufficient understanding to design a proper bill" on the issue.22
The limited statutory incursion of "de facto" parental status in the law
seems to be following the pattern of the no-fault revolution. There has been
little discussion or outcry despite the incredibly momentous change being
discussed. A unanimous vote in the Delaware Senate and a near unanimous
vote in the House suggest that the legislators there were either not aware of the
significance of what they were doing or they considered it routine to give
parental rights to numbers of unrelated adults in repudiation of all of the
principles of parentage that had obtained until the 21st Century. Proponents of
the idea of de facto parenthood would, clearly, like for this unquestioned
acceptance to continue but when it is clear what is at stake, this would be
supremely unwise.
To make the stakes clear, one need only examine the implications of the
acceptance of the principles adopted in Delaware's law and to a lesser degree in
D.C., the states with de facto court decisions and the ALI proposals.
Count Olaf Doctrine
The most obvious implication of a legal status for de facto parents is an
increase in the classes of adults who would be able to claim a status equivalent
to that accorded legal parents. Having cast off the anchors of biology, marriage
and adoption, what kinds of scenarios are likely to be covered by the Delaware
law and similar ones in other states?
The group most likely to have been in the minds of proponents in enacting
the de facto parent laws are same and opposite-sex cohabiting partners of a
child when that partner lives in the child's home. Other likely de facto parents
could be stepparents or boyfriends and girlfriends of a child's parent. Given the
not infrequent incidence of serial divorce followed by remarriage (or divorce
followed by serial cohabitation) the potential number of children who could be
affected by the recognition of this new legal status is significant. Thus, for
instance, the Delaware law (and on breakup, the D.C. law and the ALI
20. Id. at 177.
21. HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 9 (1988).
22. Id. at 12.
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Principles) would allow unrelated adults in these categories to seek a range of
parental *rights from visitation to decision-making authority for the child
because that unrelated adult had a relationship with the child facilitated by the
child's legal parent. In its de facto decision, the Washington Supreme Court
suggested that this limitation of collusion by a legal or natural parent is a
significant limitation on the kinds of people who could be recognized as de
facto parents.23 Perhaps that would be the case where a child is raised by one
legal parent and that parent's partner from birth (as was the situation in the
Washington case) and where one of the child's biological parents is unavailable
(such as a sperm donor). In serial divorce or serial cohabitation situations,
however, this limitation would not necessarily apply and a child could end up
with three or more legal parents. It is easy to imagine a parent seeking to foster
their child's relationship with a person they have just married or begun to live
with either as a way of providing a second "parent-like" person in the child's
life or as a way to cement the parent's relationship with the new spouse or
partner. Even in the same-sex couple situations that have been most prominent
in the de facto parent cases, a parent may allow a sperm or egg donor or other
adult to play a "parent-like" role in a child's life for a variety of reasons. There
have been cases where this has happened in the United States and elsewhere.
24
Unfortunately for the children involved, de facto parents are as likely to
resemble Count Olaf in A Series of Unfortunate Events25 as the unmarried version
of Ozzie and Harriett (or Harriett and Harriett) that the drafters of the de facto
law in Delaware likely had in mind. Indeed, there is reason to believe that by
endorsing parental status for cohabiting parents, the de facto laws threaten to
place children in unsafe settings. Professor Robin Wilson has powerfully
argued this point in her critique of the ALI Principles.26 A body of empirical
research bears out the concern. Children living in a cohabiting household are
more likely to experience poverty.27 They are also typically subject to significant
instability; as one study notes: "virtually all children in cohabiting-couple
families will experience rapid subsequent changes in family status." 28 They are
23. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 179 (Wash. 2005).
24. See LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. App. 2000) (involving a case where a
lesbian couple conceived with the help of a donor, and the parties agreed in writing that donor
would have a right to a "significant relationship" with the child); A.A. v. B.B., 28 D.L.R. (4th) 519,
522 (2007) (concerning same-sex partners recognizing a biological father 'sequal parenting status);
Caroline Overington, Gays seek access to friend's daughter, THE AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 15, 2009, at 1,
available at 2009 WLNR 20267459 (describing a gay couple and a lesbian couple who raised two
children jointly).
25. LEMONY SNICKET, THE BAD BEGINNING 66 (1999) (Count Olaf relied for his authority on the
related doctrine of in loco parentis).
26. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Undeserved Trust: Reflections on the ALI's Treatment of De Facto
Parents, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 90 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
27. Peter D. Brandon & Larry Bumpass, Children's Living Arrangements, Coresidence of Unmarried
Fathers, and Welfare Receipt, 22 J. FAM. ISsUES 3, 13 (2001); GREGORY ACS & SANDI NELSON, URBAN
INsT. THE KIDS ARE ALRIGHT? CHILDREN'S WELL-BEING AND THE RISE IN COHABITATION 2 (2002),
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310544_B48.pdf.; ROBERT I. LERMAN, URBAN
INST., How Do MARRIAGE, COHABITATION, AND SINGLE PARENTHOOD AFFECr THE MATERIAL
HARDSHIPS OF FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN? 20 (2002), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410539_SippPaper.pdf.
28. Deborah Roempke Graefe & Daniel T. Lichter, Life Course Transitions of American Children:
Parental Cohabitation, Marriage, and Single Motherhood, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 205, 215 (1999). See also R.
20101
Journal of Legislation
more likely to experience academic failure.29  Perhaps more tragically,
"although mothers' boyfriends perform comparatively little child care, they are
responsible for more child abuse than any other nonparental caregivers." 30
Indeed, the biological tie between parents and children "increase[s] the
likelihood that the parents [will] identify with the child and be willing to
sacrifice for that child, and it [reduces] the likelihood that either parent [will]
abuse the child."31
The law's previous preference for parenting by married biological parents,
or (as with adoption) a close substitute, admirably advanced children's
interests.32 Repudiating this preference for marriage and biological ties is an
abandonment of children's interests.
Third (and Fourth) Parents
In her important recent book on the inner lives of children of divorce,
Elizabeth Marquardt describes a common sense these children have of being
"between two worlds." The new de facto legislation may well introduce
children to the anguish of being between three or four worlds. As difficult as it
is for children to navigate between the expectations and demands of two
households, a common enough occurrence in instances of divorce, imagine the
difficulty of navigating the demands of a mother, her former partner, a sperm
donor father and perhaps even his partner - or shuttling between the homes of
a mother and father and the mother's ex-husband or ex-boyfriend. As noted
Kelly Raley & Elizabeth Wildsmith, Cohabitation and Children's Family Instability, J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
210, 216 (2004); Wendy D. Manning et al., The Relative Stability of Cohabiting and Marital Unions for
Children 15-16 (Ctr. for Family & Demographic Research, Bowling Green State Univ., Working
Paper No. 02-18, 2002), available at http://www.bgsu.edu/downloads/cas/file35355.pdf.; Larry
Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children's Family Contexts in the
U.S., 54 POPULATION STUD. 29, 33 (2000); Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, Children's Experience
in Single-Parent Families: Implications of Cohabitation and Marital Transitions, 21 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 256,
258 (1989).
29. Elizabeth Thomson et al., Family Structure and Child Well-Being: Economic Resources vs.
Parental Behaviors, 73 Soc. FORcES 221, 237 (1994); Wendy D. Manning & Kathleen Lamb, Adolescent
Well-Being in Cohabiting, Married, and Single Parent Families, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 876, 878 (2003);
Rachel Dunifon & Lori Kowaleski-Jones, Who's In the House? Race Differences in Cohabitation, Single
Parenthood, and Child Development, 73 CHILD DEV. 1249, 1260 (2002); Sandra L. Hofferth & Kermyt G.
Anderson, Are All Dads Equal? Biology Versus Marriage as a Basis for Paternal Investment, 65 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 213, 224-225 (2003).
30. Leslie Margolin, Child Abuse by Mothers' Boyfriends: Why the Overrepresentation?, 16 CHILD.
ABUSE & NEGLECT 541,548 (1992).
31. SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING Up WITH A SINGLE PARENT 38 (1994).
32. See generally Robin Fretwell Wilson & W. Bradford Wilcox, Bringing Up Baby: Adoption,
Marriage, and the Best Interests of the Child 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 883 (2006); KRISTIN ANDERSON
MOORE ET AL., CHILD TRENDS, MARRIAGE FROM A CHILD'S PERSPECTIVE: How DOES FAMILY
STRUCTURE AFFECT CHILDREN, AND WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT? (2002), available at
http://www.childtrends.org/files/MarriageRB602.pdf; Paul R. Amato, The Impact of Family
Formation Change on the Cognitive, Social, and Emotional Well-Being of the Next Generation, 15 FUTURE
CHILD. 75, 89 (2005) ("Research clearly demonstrates the children growing up with two
continuously married parents are less likely than other children to experience a wide range of
cognitive, emotional, and social problems, not only during childhood, but also in adulthood ....
This distinction is even stronger if we focus on children growing up with two happily married
biological parents.").
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above, this is not an unheard of scenario.33
This kind of complicated parenting situation threatens the stability so
important to children. It also undercuts the authority of a biological or adoptive
parent who must accommodate his or her relationship with their child to the
demands of other adults who are likely to have divergent ideas about how to
direct their child's upbringing. The time, attention and loyalty of a child are not
limitless and more adults making a claim on these resources will necessarily
diminish the share available to others. The ideal setting for children is where
marriage between the child's parents mediates their potentially conflicting
ideas and goals about the child's rearing. Here, the parents would work
together and negotiate with one another before making demands of children.34
Divorce upsets this ideal. The degree to which it does so is somewhat (though
not entirely) dependent on how well the divorcing spouses work together. The
greater the number of adults who can claim the prerogatives if a parent, the
more likely it is that a child will be faced with unsettling and disorienting
demands beyond what is fair to expect of a child.
It is important to note that even the novel proposal of the ALI recognizes
this difficulty. It thus allows judges to limit the number of adults who can
exercise major decision-making authority for a child to two.35 While this would
not shield the child from the emotional and psychological conflicts of relating to
two or more adults anxious to secure their parental status, it could limit
conflicts over children's schooling or health care.
The Delaware de facto status, by contrast, does not specify such a numerical
limit. As an example, a recent Louisiana case involved a dispute between a
same-sex couple about, among other things, which school the child of one of the
partners would attend.36 Add to this scenario, then, the not implausible
possibility that in a similar situation a third party might also have a relationship
with the child.37 Looking at this scenario under the new Delaware law, the
mother, her partner and the third adult could all assert conflicting proposals for
the child's education.
Even worse than a dispute over school, which would end with only one
program for education being chosen, are disputes over time and loyalty. These
commodities can be divided. The Delaware de facto parent law is likely to
result in children being forced to have three or more residences or to divide
filial loyalties between three or more adults, all of whom may want to have the
child treat that person as the most important "parent."
33. Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
34. ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, BETWEEN Two WORLDS: THE INNER LIVES OF CHILDREN OF DIVORCE
24 (2005).
35. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 2.09,2.18 (2002).
36. Palozzolo v. Mire, 10 So.3d 748, 754 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
37. See Martha Kirkpatrick et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparative Survey, 51
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545, 549 (1981) (reporting that female same-sex couples are more likely to
involve male friends and relatives in their children's lives).
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Foundling Fathers and Intentional Mothers
One of the ways the traditional tie between marriage and parents has
served children's interests is by promoting an ethic of unchosen obligation.
When a couple marries, they assume obligations for each other and for their
children-obligations that go beyond what they might have freely chosen if
they had known all the details before making the choice ("for richer or poorer,
in sickness and in health"). The law also enforces support obligations in
biological and adoptive parents without asking whether the parents really
intended all the implications of the choice that led to their becoming parents.
De facto parenthood, by contrast, is founded on an ethic of intention. A
person gains the de facto status because a legal parent intends for them to have
a "parent-like" relationship with the child and because they took on that role
voluntarily. The de facto doctrine endorses an entirely novel route to
parenthood - the dickered bargain. It facilitates adult arrangements, even to the
exclusion of children's legitimate interests, such as the opportunity to know and
be raised by their own mother and father and to experience the implications of
their "double origin."38
A mother who would like to raise a child with the aid of another adult but
without the participation of the child's father can more easily do so if the law
will designate the chosen adult as a parent. The sperm donor in such a situation
is a foundling father creating a child he plans not to raise or support. The new
de facto parent is a "mother" by intention.
Surely, however, children deserve a more certain protection for their
interests than a mere hope that adults will choose to take on obligations in their
behalf.
Judicial Role
Another implication of de facto parenthood is a dramatic expansion of the
role of the state in children's lives. Well established precedent recognizes a fit
parent's right to direct the upbringing of his or her child free from interference
from third parties or even the state.39 The de facto parent status allows a third
party to assert claims adverse to a fit parent's decisions, interfering with the fit
parent's constitutional rights by allowing these to be overturned in court or at
least requiring the parent to go to the trouble of defending against them.40 As
Professor Katharine K. Baker notes: "By increasing the number of people who
can assert relationship rights" de facto parent proposals "necessarily increase
the likelihood that courts, not parents, will be deciding what is in a child's best
interest."41
38. See DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 197, 156 n.59 (2007) (discussing
Sylvaine Agacinski's theory of "double origin").
39. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
40. Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 612 (Mont. 2009) (Rice, J., dissenting).
41. Katharine K. Baker, Asymmetric Parenthood, in RECONCEIVWNG THE FAMILY 122 (Robin
Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
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CONCLUSION
While the states have given limited standing to unrelated adults to have
some parental rights when a child is deprived of a relationship with one or both
parents, the novelty of the new Delaware de facto parent law cannot be stressed
too strongly. It creates an entirely new class of "parents" without any reference
to the clear, predictable relationships that have always been the foundation of
legal parenthood -biology, marriage and adoption. In doing so, it threatens
children's well-being, their stability and their opportunity to have a relationship
(wherever possible) with their own parents. It allows family courts to endlessly
second guess parental authority at the behest of an expanding category of
unrelated adults.
The Delaware legislation might seem insignificant because its radical
experiment is currently confined to that single state. In what it portends for
children and families and for state power, however, its implications could not
be more momentous. One state's creation of a legal fiction for parenthood is a
small step in U.S. law but it is a fateful one and given the probable costs, one
that ought to be reversed and certainly not followed by any other state.
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